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1
Constitutional Reason and Political
Identity
SHANE O'NEILL
This article presents a normative-theoretical account of democratic
legitimacy that meets the challenge of moral and cultural pluralism in
a way that takes the avoidance of oppression and violence to be a
fundamental imperative. The discourse-theoretical perspective of jürgen
Habermas reveals that reasoned agreement among citizens is the only
alternative to political oppression. Pace Habermas, however, the
legitimacy of even basic constitutional principles does not require us to
agree with one another for the same reasons. While we can affirm such
principles for a wide range of different reasons, the process of achieving
reasoned agreements on contentious issues draws us together as citizens
in loyalty to a particular, historical set of political institutions. The
reasoned commitment to our constitution that we come to share in this
ongoing process acts as an identity-forming bond that allows us to live
in peace with deep moral and cultural differences.
Pluralism and Legitimacy
How is legitimate law possible under conditions of democratic
pluralism? How can oppression and violence be avoided in the legal
regulation of controversial issues? In modern societies there is a
plurality of interest groups and we can expect some conflict over
matters such as taxation rates, pay awards, restrictions on smoking in
public places, the limitation of access for cars in city centres and so
on. If the legitimacy of laws regulating these matters is to be
recognised with good reason by all citizens, then the concerned
interest groups will have to achieve a fair compromise. Agreement
among the parties as to the fairness of the compromise involved is the
key here to avoiding oppression and violence in the legal regulation
of such matters.
CRISPP, Vol.4, No.3 (Autumn 2001), pp.1-26
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2 CRISPP
There are at least two other aspects of pluralism, however, that do
not lend themselves to compromise. The first concerns the
apparently irreducible yet reasonable plurality of perspectives on
certain moral questions that require legal regulation. Examples here
might include the issues at stake in debates about abortion,
euthanasia, capital punishment, pornography and the treatment of
non-human animals. To acknowledge this moral pluralism is to
recognise as a permanent feature of modern democratic culture
certain sources of moral disagreement among reasonable persons
(Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 18-26). John Rawls (1996: 54-8)
refers to these sources of disagreement as the burdens of judgement.
If we recognise the burdens of judgement we are accepting the fact
that a moral consensus is unlikely to emerge even after exhaustive
public deliberation on these questions.
The second aspect of pluralism that does not lend itself very
readily to compromise is manifested in the multicultural features of
most modern democratic societies. Questions of cultural pluralism
arise typically when religious, ethnic or national groups, usually
minorities, lay claim to particular group rights that can allow them to
continue to express their distinctive collective identity on a basis of
equality with other citizens (Kymlicka 1995a). Examples here include
the issues surrounding controversies such as the Rushdie affair in
Britain (Parekh 1995), I'affaire des foulards in France (Galeotti 1993)
or the case of the crucifix in Bavarian classrooms (Caygill & Scott
1996). When problems of cultural pluralism take an ethnonationalist
form they may also raise fundamental constitutional questions as has
been the case in Northern Ireland, Quebec and the Basque Country.
In all of these cases what is primarily at stake is not competing
interests or moral convictions, but rather the recognition and
expression of crucial aspects of the distinctive identities of the
cultural groups involved. Since an ever-increasing diversity of cultural
forms of life is evident within most democratic societies,
controversies such as these are likely to persist as features of modern
political life.
What then is to be the source of legitimacy for laws regulating
these matters of potential conflict? In the face of a plurality of
interest groups, of continuing reasonable moral disagreements and of
increasing cultural diversity, on what grounds can we expect allD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 3
citizens to recognise the law's legitimacy? A normative account of
democratic legitimacy is needed that can deal with the challenges of
pluralism in ways that avoid oppression and violence. Reasoned
agreement among citizens is the only alternative to political
oppression. But we can agree with each other as to the legitimacy of
a particular set of laws in different ways and at different levels. While
differing concerns will be paramount for different groups of citizens,
all should be able to affirm the law, if for quite different reasons.
Even when we reach agreement on those basic constitutional
principles that underpin such laws, we are likely to do so for different
reasons. In modern democratic societies it is an unwarranted
assumption, at least with regard to the legal regulation of
controversies associated with the challenge of moral and cultural
pluralism, that we will reach agreements on basic principles for the
same reasons.
The differing reasons involved in such a collective affirmation act
as complementary modes of legitimation that feed into the citizens'
shared loyalty to a set of historically unique political institutions.
Reconciliation is possible, therefore, on matters of potential conflict
if all citizens can, from their differing perspectives, come to affirm
positively those principles and laws that allow them to live together
without oppression or violence in one political community. While
such agreements contribute to the realisation of institutions of
democratic government in a constitutional state, this process draws
on citizens' capacity to identify themselves with ongoing historical
efforts to do justice to all citizens. The focus is on the need to secure
bases of agreement among citizens that will allow them to co-operate
in pursuing their task of creating and maintaining their own
legitimate constitutional structures. The primary source of unity is
the good that citizens share in seeking to ensure that the democratic
life of their particular political community can be sustained and
allowed to flourish. In achieving reasoned agreements on legitimate
laws, citizens come to share a constitutional reason that acts as an
identity-forming bond. Our commitments as citizens help to make us
who we are. The bond of shared citizenship provides an overarching
identity that facilitates within one state the peaceful coexistence of a
multiplicity of sub-cultural identities that are expressive of a wide
range of competing, comprehensive conceptions of the good.D
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4 CRISPP
From this perspective, a variety of the reasons involved in
processes of legitimate law-making are drawn together in the ongoing
achievement of a historical constitution that ties citizens to one
another in a ethically significant manner. A commitment to this
constitution is an important feature of each individual citizen's
personal identity as well as a vital source of allegiance to the state. It
represents for citizens collectively a celebration of the historical
uniqueness of their own democratic institutions. It is the citizens'
collective loyalty to their own institutions and the ethical bonds of
their shared citizenship that are vital in allowing them to live with
deep moral and cultural differences. The argument will emerge
through a critical engagement with the discourse theory of law and
democracy that has been elaborated in recent years by Jurgen
Habermas (1996; 1998a). As argued by Habermas, the legitimacy of
law is dependent on reasoned agreements. But I depart from
Habermas in at least two crucial respects.
First, as noted above, we can agree for different reasons even on
those basic constitutional principles that govern the regulation of
matters of moral and cultural pluralism. Habermas (1998b: 49-101),
in contrast, insists that basic principles must be affirmed by all
concerned for the same reasons, or from a shared viewpoint.
Secondly, I stress the identity-forming power of constitutional reason,
to make the ontological claim that our collective affirmation of a set
of laws binds us together in a shared ethical commitment to a
particular democratic form of life. Since this shared good is a
constitutive feature of each citizen's individual identity, it serves as a
shared standard of value that provides a basis for solidarity and
mutual recognition. By contrast, Habermas (1998a: 399-401;
1998b: 215-20) not only plays down the significance of the
particularist aspects of citizens' commitment to their constitution, but
he views such attachments in a wholly negative way, as a threat to
impartial reason. While he admits that it is important that citizens
share a political culture, he stresses that this culture must be a liberal
one embracing moral principles of justice that are universally valid
(1989: 207-67; 1996: 491-515; 1998a: 398-9). He bases his
expectation of shared citizen loyalty on an implausibly abstract set of
principles that are realised historically in differing constitutional
contexts. Shared loyalty involves a stronger bond than this, based onD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 5
constitutional reason with its ethical commitment to a unique set of
institutions that are expressive of a political identity that all citizens
can share.
The priority that Habermas gives the universal, the moral and the
just over the particular, the ethical and the good obscures an
important aspect of the process of democratic legitimation. This is
the central and positive role of the ethical bond created by the
uniqueness of citizens' shared identity. It is only when we attend to
the way in which constitutions express collective political identities
that we can adequately explain how reasoned agreements are possible
on many contentious issues of moral and cultural pluralism. The
underlying problem for Habermas is that he interprets ethics in an
unnecessarily restrictive manner. He also fails to acknowledge the
extent to which the moral and the ethical overlap in constitutional
discourse. In theorising democratic legitimacy we should reject both
the rigid distinction Habermas draws between morality and ethics
and his insistence on the priority of the former.
Section II defends the general thrust of Habermas' discourse
theory as a normative guide to dealing with problems of democratic
pluralism. This section argues in particular that efforts to resolve
political conflicts cannot afford to overlook Habermas' central claim
that reasoned agreement is our only alternative to violence or the
exclusion of certain citizens' perspectives from decision-making
processes. Section III explores possibilities for reasoned agreement
and outlines six different modes of legitimation that allow citizens of
a pluralist democracy to endorse its laws. This six-fold typology of
political reasoning reveals that, while reasoned agreements can be
complex and multi-layered, they can also feed a shared commitment
that binds citizens in loyalty to their own constitution. Section IV
argues that there is no need to follow Habermas in claiming that
citizens must affirm the legitimacy of basic constitutional principles
for the same reasons. This argument is developed through an analysis
of the moral-political conflict concerning abortion. Habermas fails to
appreciate fully the complementary roles that morality and ethics
play as modes of legitimation for principles governing such
controversies. The concluding section outlines the relation between
morality and ethics in this conception of constitutional democracy.D
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6 CRISPP
Critics have argued that the ideal of consensus that governs
Habermas' discourse theory may fail to give due recognition to
legitimate differences (McCarthy 1998; Ashenden 1998). The model
of reasoned agreements presented is more modest than Habermas'
since it is not based on the false hope that a rational consensus can,
under ideal conditions, emerge on all substantively controversial
political questions (Habermas 1998a: 403-4). We can afford to give
up this strong expectation of consensus so long as we hold to the
weaker expectation that all citizens may have good reason to
recognise the legitimacy of law. This weaker expectation must not be
dropped if we continue to take the avoidance of oppression and
violence as a fundamental imperative directing democratic politics.
Our Need for Reasoned Agreements
Is the reasoned agreement of all citizens really the only democratic
alternative to political oppression? Surely, given the reality of
pluralism, this is too demanding a requirement for legitimate law?
When faced with controversies of moral and cultural pluralism it may
initially seem that universal agreement among citizens is unattainable.
Two points may be made before we defend the need for reasoned
agreements. First, we may accept that a rational consensus on the
substantive content of any set of laws regulating such controversial
matters is unlikely to emerge. It does not follow that citizens who
object to some aspect of that content can have no reason to support
such laws. It remains to establish how citizens finding a law
objectionable may still agree to its legitimacy.
Secondly, any alternative approach which denies that reasoned
agreement is an irreplaceable source of legitimacy may have crucial
normative weaknesses. If a certain group of citizens has no positive
reason to affirm a legal norm for its own sake, then it becomes subject
to regulations that are externally imposed. Members of a group upon
whom law is imposed cannot see themselves, in any sense, as authors
of that law (Baynes 1995; Habermas 1996; Rehg & Bohman 1996).
They will, in effect, consider themselves excluded from full
membership of the political community. At best they can affirm the
law only for prudential reasons, for fear of the consequences of
withholding such affirmation. Any political arrangement thatD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 7
depends on such a modus vivendi is not only inherently unstable,
relying as it must on a particular balance of social forces, but it cannot
offer any distinction between a fair compromise and a bargain that is
forced on one party (Habermas 1996: 289-95; Rawls 1996: 145-9).
While much legislation is based on compromise between competing
groups, the basis for the legitimacy of the legislation is that all groups
have some reason to view the compromise as fair. If one group has
not had an adequate opportunity to articulate its views, or if its
position is not given appropriate weight in the formulation of the
compromise, then the legislation is oppressive. When groups of
citizens have no good reasons to affirm the law then politics becomes
war by other means.
From the perspective of a normatively justifiable account of
democracy the forms of oppression and violence that must
assiduously be avoided are those that are rooted in citizens' alienation
from the institutions of the state. When some citizens are given no
reason to affirm a set of laws, this causes a rupture in the political
community. The community is divided between those who can see
themselves as authors of the law and those who cannot. If problems
of cultural pluralism, to take the most obvious cases, are not dealt
with in a way that gives all groups some positive reason to affirm the
law, then those citizens who are alienated by the law will see
themselves as second class citizens. This reflects a failure to deal with
cultural differences in a fair or impartial manner (Jones 1998:
36—42). This kind of failure is, for example, the root of the political
conflict in Northern Ireland (McGarry & O'Leary 1995). Many Irish
nationalists found no good reason to affirm a constitutional
arrangement exclusively expressive of a national identity they
associated with colonisation and domination. In the absence of any
institutional recognition of their Irish identity, they were incapable of
showing any loyalty to the state. State institutions, and the symbols
and emblems that are representative of them, were experienced as
instruments of oppression. The connection between this form of
alienation and the violence that traumatised Northern Irish society
for much of the last three decades is clear.
While problems of cultural pluralism, particularly those involving
ethnonational struggles that call basic constitutional arrangements
into question, can lead to oppressive outcomes, so too can problemsD
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8 CRISPP
of moral pluralism. A group of citizens who believe the law is
insensitive to their deeply held moral convictions will feel alienated
and oppressed by those laws. Controversies such as those associated
with abortion or the treatment of non-human animals are often in
danger of spilling over into violence. If the groups concerned feel
that their input has been silenced or ignored, then they have no good
reason to affirm the law's legitimacy. Once heard, they are more
likely to find a reason to affirm a law supported by others, even if it
is one they consider morally objectionable. Accounts of legitimacy
based simply on a contingent convergence of interests cannot succeed
in showing how oppression and violence are best avoided. To this
extent, Habermas is right to theorise legitimacy in relation to our
need for reasoned agreements.
Procedures of Agreement as Modes of Democratic Legitimation
One important feature of Habermas' discourse theory of democracy
is his insistence that positive law should not be subordinated to
morality (1996: 108-18, 151-7, 233-7, 450-53). Legal and moral
questions are structured differently. The democratic procedures
involved in the legitimation of law are far more complex than those
involved in moral argumentation. In moral discourse 'the interests
embodied in contested norms are unreservedly universalizable'
(Habermas 1996: 162). In contrast, democratic will-formation may
depend not only on moral reasoning, but also on ethical-political and
pragmatic reasoning as well as fair compromises negotiated by social
groups holding competing value orientations and interest positions
through normatively regulated processes of bargaining (1996:
159-68). So while moral norms are justified only in relation to a set
of reasons that could be acceptable to all human beings, a range of
different kinds of reason can legitimate law. Pragmatic questions are
concerned with the most effective realisation of collective goals that
are already agreed. Ethical-political questions arise when previously
agreed goals are called into question or when the values in dispute are
so fundamental as to lead to a critical exploration of a community's
self-understanding. We may distinguish between two forms of ethical-
political reasoning. Ethical sub-cultural reasoning represents the
reflection of a particular socio-cultural group on its distinctive idealsD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 9
and aspirations. In contrast, ethical constitutional reasoning
represents the reflection of the political community as a whole on the
identity and values that all its citizens share. Constitutional reasoning
binds all the members of the political community together in
solidarity and in this way it acts as the primary source of unity in
modern pluralist societies.
A key aspect of this account of democratic politics is the idea that
the differing reasons we have for affirming the legitimacy of law can
draw us together as citizens in a shared commitment to the good of
our political community. These reasons act as complementary modes
of legitimation that bind us to one another in an ethically significant
manner. There are at least six kinds of reason that act as modes of
legitimation in facilitating the non-violent resolution of many
disputes associated with the challenges of pluralism. Legal validity
has a multidimensional character in that the various modes of
legitimation carry different weights depending on the question
concerned. Furthermore the weight attached to these different
reasons will not be the same for the various parties to the agreement.
On some questions one mode of legitimation may be a primary
consideration for all citizens. In such a case, where substantive
rational consensus is reached on the content of the law, this consensus
can carry the entire burden of legitimacy. More typically, however,
multidimensional agreements are required.
We can now outline six forms of reasoned agreement that act as
modes of democratic legitimation. Each of these forms of agreement
plays some role in Habermas' own discourse theoretical framework,
but here they are presented in a systematic way. This will clear the
way for me to highlight the two ways in which Habermas' account
should be revised. First, while he acknowledges that we can affirm
the legitimacy of particular laws for different reasons, Habermas
insists that we must agree on basic constitutional principles for the
same reasons. The question of basic principles is taken up in the next
section. Second, the account presented here stresses the identity-
forming power of constitutional reason. Once the six modes of
legitimation are outlined, constitutional reasoning will be introduced
as the resultant binding force that unites citizens in loyalty to their
institutions. While citizens will have different reasons to affirm a law,
their joint affirmation of the multidimensional framework in whichD
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10 CRISPP
the law is legitimated provides them with a shared commitment that
facilitates the mutual recognition of their equal membership of the
political community. The law itself then becomes a feature of the
ongoing constitutional achievements of that political community. It
becomes a feature of their shared constitutional reason.
Let us now review the six ways in which citizens may confer
legitimacy on a law:
1. Affirming the Substantive Content of Law for Moral Reasons.
Citizens may agree with the substantive moral content of the law.
In some cases almost all citizens may affirm the law for such
reasons. Think, for example, of the way in which a rational
consensus on the moral norm forbidding the taking of another
human life underpins homicide law. In other cases, only some
citizens are able to affirm a legal norm for moral reasons. This is
illustrated in the discussion of the abortion question in the next
section.
2. Affirming the Law for Ethical Sub-Cultural Reasons.
Some citizens might acknowledge the validity of a law as a
reflection of the collective self-understanding, and shared identity,
of the members of a particular sub-cultural group to which they
feel an affiliation. In such a case the law is seen to be good in that
it facilitates the achievement of some of that group's collective
goals. For example, women may affirm a law that furthers the
cause of gender equality, or a minority group may affirm a law
that recognises them as equal citizens in their cultural difference.
This mode of legitimation will normally provide a basis for the
affirmation of law only for some citizens.
3. Agreeing on the Fairness of a Compromise.
This is most typically the primary mode of legitimation in cases
where parties agree on a compromise for different substantive
reasons. Take for example the regulation of smoking in public
places where we can expect defenders of smokers' right and
advocates of non-smokers' rights to agree, for different reasons, to
something that falls far short of their ideal. Such a compromise
should be justified in light of a shared recognition of the moralD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 11
fairness of the conditions under which it is made. Nobody should
be forced into a compromise and political rights must be socially
effective for all (Bohman 1997; Knight & Johnson 1997).
4. Agreeing on the Legitimacy of the Legal Decision-Making
Procedures.
This mode of legitimation allows for continuing disagreement on
the substantive moral content of the law and so it is often crucial
in cases of moral pluralism. This will be the primary mode of
legitimation for many citizens in relation to controversial issues
such as abortion. As in the case of compromises, those who affirm
the law for such reasons must recognise the fairness of the
procedures under which a legally binding decision is taken. They
must also agree on the fairness of the conditions under which
public deliberation on the question of moral controversy has
taken place, again, with important implications regarding
distributive justice. Citizens may continue to challenge a law
vigorously in public arenas but they will recognise the law's
legitimacy, despite the fact that it conflicts with their own moral
convictions.
5. Agreeing Pragmatically on the Advice of Experts.
Particular policies might be adopted into legal programmes on the
basis of an agreement that the proposed laws reflect in a balanced
way the current advice of experts. Such laws are typically
concerned with the most efficient means to a democratically
legitimated end. An example might be the adoption of a particular
economic policy in pursuit of a reduction in unemployment levels,
or new policies that can balance the goals of economic and
technological development with a concern for environmental
protection.
6. Agreeing to Differentiated Sets of Rights for the Sake of Mutual
Accommodation.
This mode of legitimation is primary for many in cases of cultural
pluralism where some citizens recognise a need for mutual
accommodation with members of other cultural groups, typically
religious, ethnic or national minorities. This realisation allowsD
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12 CRISPP
these citizens to accept that others should have special rights that
protect or facilitate the expression of their cultural particularity.
The recognition of distinct cultural needs makes possible, under
appropriate circumstances, differential treatment under the law,
or an asymmetrical set of rights. Once again, the fairness of the
conditions under which such accommodations are to be justified
must be recognised by all concerned.
Taken together these six modes of legitimation make possible non-
violent agreements on the legitimacy of laws regulating a very wide
range of controversial issues that are often socially divisive in
pluralist democratic societies. It might, of course still be possible for
citizens to have good reason to doubt the legitimacy of a particular
law. They may believe that their moral perspective has not yet
adequately been addressed, concerning say the treatment of non-
human animals. Or, they may think that the majority culture has
made no effort to recognise the distinctive needs of their culture. In
such cases, it might be possible to justify a campaign of civil
disobedience as a last resort so as to dramatise the claims of a
minority. But what this amounts to is a questioning of the fairness of
the procedures according to which these matters have been legally
processed. Civil disobedience then acts as an intervention in an
ongoing moral discourse about the fairness of our democratic
procedures.
If citizens can affirm the same law for different reasons then they
can come to renew a shared commitment to their legal institutions
and to each other as equal citizens of a particular political
community. In this sense they share a constitutional reason that acts
as an ethically significant identity-forming bond for each of them.
Our laws are ethically grounded in that they are deemed to be good
for an inclusive 'us', that is for all citizens of our political community
at this historical juncture. Constitutional reason tells us that since a
law defuses a potentially damaging conflict, it serves the community
of citizens well by allowing us to continue to engage in a process of
collective reflection on our self-understanding as an aspect of our
ongoing project of law-making. In this sense the law reflects the
citizens' shared identity without glossing over significant differences
and divisions.D
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 13
We need to clarify the relation between the two forms of ethical
reasoning involved in this account. At a sub-cultural level we reflect
on those aspects of our identity that distinguish us from other citizens
as members of a particular socio-cultural group. At a constitutional
level we reflect on an identity-forming commitment that we share
with all fellow citizens to a particular set of political institutions. With
respect to issues of moral and cultural pluralism we often need to
address ethical-political questions at both levels simultaneously
(O'Neill 1997: 169-73; Habermas 1998a: 397-8). Take for example
the Rushdie affair or the conflict in Northern Ireland. In the wake of
the Rushdie controversy both the Muslim minority and the (post-)
Christian majority in Britain are called on to reflect critically on their
particular identities while also assessing together what the
implications should be for their shared identity as British citizens.
Similarly, in Northern Ireland the two main national groups are called
on to reflect critically on their particular national identities and to
assess the implications for their collective identity as citizens who have
shared a fraught and troubled history. These examples illustrate the
fact that at a sub-cultural level we need to engage in a self-critical
effort to reconcile our distinctive group identities with the political
identity we share with all citizens. But at a constitutional level we need
to reflect on a shared identity in a way that is ever more inclusive of
all socio-cultural groups in our society. It is the historical uniqueness
of the particular constitution that reflects the dynamic nature of the
collective identity shared by all citizens of a pluralist democracy. The
argument can best be developed with a more detailed analysis of one
notorious ongoing political controversy, that concerning abortion.
Morality and Ethics: The Case of Abortion
Habermas equivocates on the morality of abortion. Evidence for this
is provided by the fact that he initially depicts abortion as an example
of a moral issue in Faktizitdt und Geltung (1992: 204), while it does
not appear in the English translation of this passage in Between Facts
and Norms (1996: 165). The most plausible explanation for this
omission is that the counterintuitive logic of Habermas' argument
demands that abortion be treated as an ethical, not a moral, question,
one that can be answered only within the context of a particular formD
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14 CRISPP
of life (1993: 59-60). It seems clear that abortion raises moral
questions, as do the controversies surrounding euthanasia, capital
punishment, pornography and the treatment of non-human animals.
The arguments that are put forward by many of the participants to
debates about these matters typically do not draw exclusively on
reasons that are tied to the traditions and practices of one particular
form of life. They rather use reasons connected to interests that are
unreservedly universalisable.
Habermas' discomfort with the moral status of these claims is to
be explained by the way in which he distinguishes rigidly between
moral universalism and ethical particularism and the priority he
places on the former over the latter. He insists that any reasoned
agreement on the legal regulation of controversial matters will
depend on a moral consensus that allows us to treat the substantive
question as one that reflects an ethical difference between coexisting
forms of life (Habermas 1998a: 392-3). This assertion of the priority
of the moral over the ethical is grounded, therefore, in Habermas'
assumption that it is possible to separate these domains in practice
(1996: 280-82; 1998b: 89-94). This is a problematic assumption
that involves an inadequate understanding of both morality and
ethics. Habermas' approach to matters of moral and cultural
pluralism is insufficiently sensitive to the political interpenetration of
moral and ethical discourses.
By analysing political aspects of the abortion controversy we can
see how Habermas' insistence on the priority of morality over ethics
is to be applied in practice. Habermas (1998a: 390^04) clarifies his
position on this matter in a reply to Thomas McCarthy (1998). One
of McCarthy's main criticisms of Habermas' account of legitimacy is
that he places an implausible burden of expectation on the possibility
that a rational consensus could eventually emerge on all controversial
matters of moral and cultural pluralism. The dispute about abortion,
for example, should perhaps be taken to represent a reasonable
disagreement about the meaning and value of life, a disagreement that
persists even after exhaustive efforts to achieve in public a rational
consensus on the morally substantive claims at stake. Habermas argues
that this conflict can be neutralised if a morally grounded equal right
to coexistence can be guaranteed to each of the interpretive
communities participating in the dispute. How is this to be achieved?D
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 15
Habermas admits that in a case like abortion, 'we are faced with a
value conflict that cannot be resolved either by discourse or by
compromise'. For this reason he treats the matter as 'an ethically
controversial issue' reflecting different collective self-understandings
of various groups of citizens. A neutral regulation is only possible at
the more abstract level of morality where we might expect an equal
right to coexistence to 'find the rationally motivated recognition of
all parties to the conflict'. He continues:
To accomplish this shift in the level of abstraction, a shift in
perspective is required. Each participant must turn away from
the ethical question of which regulation is respectively 'best for
us' from 'our' point of view. They must instead take the moral
point of view and examine which regulation is 'equally good for
all' in view of the prior claim to an equal right to coexist
(Habermas 1998a: 392-3).
According to Habermas this shift in perspective allows the parties to
arrive at a morally acceptable solution, or 'a regulation acceptable to
each party for the same reasons', without resolving the substantive
dispute.
Habermas seems to suggest here that a legal regulation on
abortion must achieve two things if it is to be legitimate. First, it must
guarantee an equal right of coexistence to all interpretive
communities and second, it must show itself to be equally good for
all. He qualifies this view significantly, however, by admitting that all
the consequences that follow from a just solution may lead to 'an
unequal distribution of "hardships'". So it seems that while an equal
right of coexistence may well permit abortions under certain legally
defined circumstances, those who find abortion to be morally
impermissible will have to tolerate it. They may, of course, continue
to understand their abhorrence of the practice of abortion to be an
important aspect of their group identity and so they do not have to
compromise their deeply held convictions on the matter. Habermas
views tolerance as 'the price for living together in an egalitarian legal
community in which groups with different cultural and ethnic
backgrounds must get along with one another', at least if oppression
and violence are to be avoided. He believes that since this solution
based on the right to coexist can be 'accepted by all for the sameD
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16 CRISPP
reasons' it 'spares citizens the essentially more painful, integrity-
endangering compromises in irreconcilable value conflicts' (1998a:
393). A right to coexistence, agreed by all for the same reasons,
grounds, according to Habermas, a basic constitutional principle of
tolerance that provides a democratic framework for the non-violent
legal resolution of the abortion controversy.
In his recent discussion of Rawls (1998b: 92-4), Habermas
assumes that a reasonable legal resolution of the abortion controversy
will permit a 'liberal' outcome. He argues that Rawls should think of
political values as a requirement of practical reason that must be
imposed on competing worldviews. Habermas mentions abortion
when he refers to those who 'assert that their religious conviction
concerning the inviolability of life is more important than any
political value in whose name other citizens urge them to accept, say,
a moderately liberal regulation'. Given the context we may assume
that Habermas believes that the priority of political values should be
imposed on such a recalcitrant religious worldview and that a 'pro-
life' position based on religious conviction inevitably violates the
demands of practical reason. In contrast Rawls himself (1999: 606
n82) believes that an argument denying a right to abortion can be put
forward within the domain of public reason.
There are a number of problems with Habermas' position. First,
even if we agree that each interpretive community has an equal right
to coexist, this does not determine a legitimate outcome in law. Both
communities can, in principle, coexist while remaining true to their
convictions whether the law permits abortion or not. While a law
permitting abortion would weigh heavily on those who find it to be
morally impermissible, they are asked to tolerate it for the sake of
getting along with those who view the matter from a different
perspective. Similarly while a legal ban on all abortions would weigh
heavily on those who find the denial of choice to be abhorrent, they
could be asked to tolerate it and to acknowledge that others see it
differently. A basic constitutional norm of tolerance does not
determine where the burden should be placed. Habermas'
assumption that '[in] general, abstraction tends to work in favor of
"liberal" regulation' (1998a: 393) would, therefore, seem to be
unwarranted. We do not have any grounds for assuming that 'liberal'
regulation permitting abortion will, in general, be best at securing anD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 17
equal right to coexistence. It depends very much on the context and
on the moral convictions of the citizens involved. So we still need to
know how a legal outcome is legitimately to be determined.
Habermas is trading here on an unnecessarily rigid interpretation
of the distinction between morality and ethics. At a political level,
ethical considerations involve a particular group of citizens (bound
together by some shared sense of belonging - religious, cultural or
whatever) reflecting on how they are to pursue their own good in a
given context. In contrast moral considerations always involve
reflection on what is equally good for all concerned. So while the
ethical sphere is always clearly bounded, the scope of morality is
limitless and in principle global. Habermas connects morality and
universality with justice and Tightness, while ethics is connected to
particular, context-bound conceptions of the good. By asserting the
priority of morality over ethics, he is following Kant in affirming the
deontological claim that the right is prior to the good, a claim that
structures his account of constitutional democracy. But disputes such
as that concerning abortion should motivate us to reconsider the
relationship between morality and ethics in a discourse theory of
democratic legitimacy.
Those who hold deep moral convictions about the abhorrence of
abortion are not likely to reinterpret these convictions simply as being
aspects of the ethical self-understanding of their particular group. In
order to do that they would have to think of these convictions as being
ones that are valid only for them and so they would have to reject the
idea that the interests of the unborn they seek to protect raise claims
that are unreservedly universalisable. The dispute about abortion
cannot be relegated to a narrowly circumscribed realm of ethics that
can be overridden by the universalist perspective of morality. This is
in effect what Habermas is seeking to do. His motivation for adopting
this view would seem to be explained by the fact that he cannot afford
to admit that the dispute about abortion really does represent a moral
disagreement. This is so because he does not contemplate the
possibility that moral discourse can in principle, even under ideal
conditions, lead to a persistently reasonable dissensus as well as to a
rational consensus. We give an unnecessarily restrictive and
implausible account of the moral domain if we insist that only those
substantive norms on which we could, in principle, achieve a rationalD
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18 CRISPP
consensus can be thought to raise moral claims. From a participant's
perspective, the moral force and universalist thrust of the claim that
abortion is an abhorrent violation of the rights of the unborn is in no
way reduced by the fact that advocates of a liberal position can
support their view with reasons.
Furthermore, Habermas' position on this issue reveals an
unacceptably narrow understanding of ethics. From his perspective
ethical reflection is reduced to the aspiration to remain true to the
established patterns of a particular tradition, or form of life. By
stressing the aspiration to authenticity, this presents a rather static
view of ethical-political discourses (1996: 161). When particular
groups of citizens reflect on their own good, they are not only
concerned with authenticity. Ethical-political discourse can also
involve dynamic, open and critical explorations of collective identities
that invoke a whole range of ideals such as those of inclusion and
autonomy (Smith 1997: 129; McCarthy 1998: 122-3; Cooke 1999).
Habermas seems to have something like this in mind when he
discusses the kind of self-clarification involved for groups of women
and men in the ongoing contestation about the boundary between
public and private domains (1996: 409-27). Even though these
dynamics of contestation involve groups in reflecting on their
collective identities, Habermas does not present this process as a form
of ethical-political discourse. In relation to the abortion controversy,
however, he asks how those who find abortion abhorrent can continue
to live authentically in a way that allows them to be true to their
ethical convictions. Habermas overlooks the extent to which ethics
can take us beyond a concern for authenticity by involving us in
dynamic and open processes of critical self-questioning.
Collective identities are called into question in encounters with
other interpretive communities. In the dispute about abortion
participants are simultaneously called on to interrogate their
collective identities as members of particular groups of citizens and as
members of the totality of citizens sharing one historically constituted
democratic form of life. The identity of the sub-cultural groups can
be transformed as they come to see the issue from the perspective of
other groups. This is not to say that they will reach agreement about
the moral substance of their dispute. They can, however, find
themselves rethinking their own position, re-evaluating theirD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 19
convictions or transforming aspects of their identities as they engage
in dialogue with others. They may become more tolerant of the
opposing viewpoint, or they may realise that their original
perspective had not been sufficiently subtle to deal with the
complexities involved. Whatever the outcome any genuine dialogue
will be self-transformative in giving all participants new ways of
seeing themselves, as members of particular groups and as citizens of
the political community as a whole.
One important aspect, therefore, of these disputes about laws
regulating a moral controversy like abortion is the fact that it engages
all participants in a constitutional discourse about their shared
identity as citizens of a particular political community. For Habermas,
once we take the perspective of all citizens, we 'shift' to the moral
point of view. But this runs the risk of obscuring the fact that citizens
within one constitutional state are tied to one another in ethically
significant ways. While an effort to see the controversy in any one
state from the point of view of all citizens does indeed involve us
adopting a more abstract view, that view has not escaped the identity-
forming power of ethical reflection at the constitutional level. Even
the view that all interpretive communities have an equal right to
coexist is in itself ethically significant. It invites us to think of
ourselves as members of a democratic community whose distinctive,
shared identity is inclusive of all its citizens regardless of their moral
convictions on controversies such as abortion. This says something
about the kind of political community we have become and it reflects
our aspirations, our achievements and important aspects of our
history as a unique democratic form of life. In short, it reflects a
shared idea of what is good for us at this historical juncture.
Habermas insists that once we adopt the perspective of all citizens
we must consider what is morally 'right' for all and not what is 'good'
for those of us who belong to a collectivity distinguished by a
particular ethos (1998a: 387-8). This obscures the ethical/
constitutional dimension of legal discourse as a shared horizon on the
democratic good, or a constitutional ethos that facilitates the
resolution of such controversies. It does not follow, however, that
sharing a constitutional ethos implies that citizens must share a
comprehensive conception of the good - a view that Habermas
attributes to communitarians.D
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20 CRISPP
Moral-political disputes about abortion cannot be reduced to a
discourse about what is morally right for everyone. These disputes
are concerned with the ongoing clarification of the collective identity
that citizens share. Moral dissensus may well have to be
acknowledged. But what makes reconciliation possible is the
commitment citizens share with regard to a particular democratic
way of life. This shared commitment draws on different and possibly
conflicting reasons as to why each of us may sometimes have to
affirm the legitimacy of laws with respect to a principle of tolerance
that underpins them. It appears that Habermas is wrong to suppose
that citizens share the same moral reason for affirming a basic
principle of tolerance, based on an equal right to coexist, and thus
that he is wrong to expect, on these grounds, to reconcile through
legal regulation mutually opposed sides on abortion. Basic
constitutional rights can be justified even if citizens come to affirm
them from different perspectives.
Habermas (1996: 356, 371-2, 440), in his reply to McCarthy
(1998a: 393-7), mentions an alternative to the notion of all citizens
sharing the same moral reason for supporting tolerance. This
alternative he refers to as 'legitimation through procedures' and he
thinks it throws further light on how a particular legal regulation may
be legitimated. In modern complex societies mutual understanding
can emerge through complex communicative processes that
incorporate various discourses - moral, ethical and pragmatic - as well
as procedures of negotiation that lead to fair compromises. These
constitutional procedures are such that all citizens can accept as legally
binding the particular decisions that emerge from them. The
procedures act as a system of sluices, or legitimation filters, which
transform the concerns that citizens express in public spheres into
binding law. Hence these outcomes carry a presumption of rationality.
According to Habermas, even if agreement on an equal right of
coexistence does not determine the legitimacy of a particular law, all
citizens can presume that the outcome of constitutionally established
processes of deliberation and decision-making will be both rational
and legitimate. An appropriately qualified institutionalisation of
majority rule represents for Habermas one of the most important
decision procedures carrying legitimating force (1996: 179-80;
1998a: 396-7). The laws that regulate abortion presumably have toD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 21
be determined eventually by some form of majority decision. As
noted earlier, one may support the legitimacy of a law whose content
one finds objectionable. People who accept that procedures do
bestow legitimacy, can, in good conscience, continue to engage in
efforts to change the law. Where abortion is allowed, those who
oppose it may accept the legitimacy of majority rule, and thus the
temporary legitimacy of abortion as sanctioned by a majority, while
nonetheless seeking strenuously to change the law. Where abortion is
not allowed or severely constrained, those who wish to legalise or
liberalise it, remain free to argue their case. Either way, citizens can
accept a law as temporarily legitimate, while continuing to dispute its
morality or desirability. If there is to be a presumption of rationality
associated with the operation of these legitimating procedures, then
it must be based on a prior commitment to a norm guaranteeing the
equal right of coexistence for competing interpretive communities.
Where Habermas' position is most unconvincing is in his efforts
to show that all citizens, for the same moral reasons, can affirm a legal
regulation governing abortion. Habermas thinks that the legal
outcome generated by a set of democratic procedures can be
presumed to be rational by all those who affirm a moral consensus on
a principle of tolerance that secures an equal right of coexistence. But
even if all citizens affirm a constitutional principle that allows the
procedural legitimation of laws, they will presumably be motivated
by different and possibly conflicting reasons. Some will find a moral
reason for affirming this principle, but it is unlikely to be the same
moral reason for each of them. Others may find an ethical/sub-
cultural reason and again there is likely to be a plurality of such
reasons. What is important is that these differing moral and ethical
reasons fuse at the level of constitutional reasoning. Once each of the
various groups of citizens can find some justification for the principle
of tolerance that grounds an equal right of coexistence, they can
share a commitment to the historically unique set of political
institutions that embody their specific democratic form of life. Let us
take a sample of possible perspectives.
Jill might affirm the morality of tolerance because she is committed
to a secular humanist outlook that puts a high premium on personal
autonomy. But Jack may find such tolerance to be morally required
not for this reason but because he thinks of all human beings, believersD
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22 CRISPP
and non-believers, as children of God who are deserving of respect. So
while the moral outlooks of Jack and Jill clash quite fundamentally,
they converge in the affirmation of a political principle of tolerance
(see also Rawls 1996: 133-72, 385-95). A third citizen, Ben, may not
think that tolerance is a necessary requirement of morality at all. He
may see it rather as a necessary condition for the flourishing of the
ethnic minority with which he identifies. He might be morally inclined
not to tolerate those who think abortion is acceptable but this
consideration is outweighed by the fact that he realises that the good
of his sub-cultural group depends very much on the creation and
maintenance of a tolerant society. Meanwhile, for Barbara the love of
her nation may outweigh any moral inclination she has not to tolerate
those who oppose laws permitting abortion. Even if she is part of the
majority nation, this kind of nationalism represents an ethical sub-
cultural commitment in the context of a multinational society. Barbara
may feel that it reflects badly on her nation if it were to be stubborn
and unflinching in the way it deals with moral conflicts and so she is
willing to affirm an equal right of coexistence. Ben and Barbara have
different ethical sub-cultural reasons for affirming a constitutional
principle of tolerance and while one is expressive of the good of a
minority culture the other expresses the concerns of the majority
nation.
All four of these citizens come to affirm the same principle from
their very different perspectives. But once they can all recognise the
legitimacy of the others' reasons, even if they do not share them, they
bind themselves together in a commitment to their particular
democratic way of life. None of them wants to see their political
community torn apart on this matter and so they are willing to
tolerate their differences and to allow the law regulating abortion to
be generated by a previously legitimated set of democratic procedures.
Each of them should then be capable of sharing the ethical
constitutional perspective that will allow them to recognise that law as
an expression of the political identity of the community at a particular
historical juncture. Shared constitutional reason has identity-forming
power in revealing to us an aspect of who we are and in helping each
of us to reaffirm our commitments to one another.
Can we distinguish this reasoned process of agreement from the
kind of modus vivendi that we need to avoid if we are to minimiseD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 23
oppression and violence? Once the shared commitment to an
underlying principle of tolerance emerges freely through formal and
informal processes of reason and will formation, then clearly this
kind of arrangement is qualitatively different from such a modus
vivendi. In this process none of the participants have been coerced or
pressurised into accepting an unfair bargain. Reasoned agreements
emerge through legal discourses that take place under conditions of
fairness. In coming to accept the legitimacy of others' reasons, all
participating citizens commit themselves to a principle of toleration
that acts as a vital bond of solidarity. Their commitment to mutual
toleration then becomes a shared standard of value with which they
all identify themselves.
Abortion aside, similar patterns of agreement can be traced in
relation to certain controversies of cultural pluralism, even in the
context of deep ethnonational struggle. Take, for example, Northern
Ireland's 'Good Friday' Agreement that was legitimated by
referendum in May 1998. The principles of tolerance and non-
domination that underpin that Agreement gained the support of 71
per cent of the population in Northern Ireland for a variety of
reasons. It is highly likely that some affirmed these principles for
moral reasons, varying along a continuum from the religious to the
secular. Others affirmed the principles for ethical sub-cultural reasons
in that the constitutional framework embodied in the Agreement
facilitates the peaceful pursuit of the good of both ethnonational
communities. Some unionists supported the Agreement, not for
moral reasons, but because they saw it as a means of securing the
Union with Great Britain. Some Irish Republicans supported the
Agreement because they saw it as a means of pursuing the ultimate
goal of a United Ireland. So long as they recognise the legitimacy of
the reasons others have for accepting the underlying norms of
toleration and non-domination, all the Agreement's supporters are
bound together to defend this constitutional project. They have come
to share a constitutional reason that commits them to ensuring that
this institutional framework succeeds as a means of mutually
accommodating the peaceful coexistence of two historically
antagonistic national communities. All are bound in their
identification with a new, culturally bi-national Northern Ireland.D
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24 CRISPP
Binding Ourselves to the Constitution (and Each Other)
Morality does not override ethics in this account of constitutional
democracy. For some citizens moral reasoning is indeed decisive in
facilitating the generation of legitimate law on controversies of moral
and cultural pluralism. For others, it is ethical sub-cultural
commitments that are decisive. The law itself binds all together in
common affirmation of an ongoing constitutional arrangement. In
this sense it is a shared, identity-forming, constitutional perspective
that is the focus of unity. Constitutional reasons are the only reasons
that all citizens really come to share as they are drawn together in
loyalty to their achievements as a particular people.
This account of democratic legitimation does not depend on the
communitarian view that all citizens must share a comprehensive
conception of the good life. Nor does it imply any defence of a form
of nationalism that stresses the linguistic, cultural or spiritual unity of
a people (Viroli 1995; Lawson 1998). Loyalty to a constitution can
be based on a commitment to the ongoing construction of a
historically unique democratic form of life that does not require
ideals of comprehensive ethical unity or of national purity. As citizens
of a particular democracy we are bound up with one another in
relations that are constitutive of our collective political identities. We
share a history that has marked us in distinctive ways and this is
expressed politically through the institutions of the state as well as
the flags, symbols, anthems and so on that are representative of our
past struggles. Loyalty is not given in the abstract to the values and
principles that we share with the citizens of other constitutional
states, but rather to the concrete historical achievement of
democratic institutions that have been established for us in a unique
cultural context (Larmore 1996: 211-13).
Habermas' distinction between the unreservedly universalisable
nature of morality and the contextual particularity of ethics is valid.
But we cannot explain how reasoned agreements are possible on laws
regulating many controversial issues if we follow him in endorsing
the priority of morality, or justice, over ethics, or the good. The
relationship between morality and ethics is more complex than
Habermas assumes it to be. Neither takes priority as a ground for
reasoned agreement. We must rather rely on a pool of reasons that
can be gathered together in a process of non-violent law-making. InD
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CONSTITUTIONAL REASON AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 25
legitimating the law, we commit ourselves to a particular constitution
and in this to an identity-forming ethic.
If we can achieve complex reasoned agreements on controversial
topics, the need for a moral card that can trump ethics will not arise
(Habermas 1998a: 401). Although in his most recent work Habermas
(1998a: 399-402; 1998b: 215-20) recognises the ethical permeation
of law, he reiterates his view that justice must, in principle, be
independent of context. This universalist perspective should inform
our thinking in relation to human rights and international law and it
should play a significant role in our deliberations concerning the
needs of immigrants and asylum seekers. To resolve political conflicts
within a state, democratic justice must reflect the achievement by
citizens of an inclusive political culture. A commitment to certain
universally valid moral truths will form part of this achievement. But
even this commitment does not require us to abstract ourselves from
our shared ethos or the ongoing dynamic of our collective identity.
Justice within a political community is based less upon external
validation than upon reasoned agreement, complex and multi-
layered, among citizens seeking to regulate their life together without
oppression and violence.
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